Self-authenticating chip

ABSTRACT

Embodiments of the present invention provide an authenticating service of a chip having an intrinsic identifier (ID). In a typical embodiment, an authenticating device is provided that includes an identification (ID) engine, a self-test engine, and an intrinsic component. The intrinsic component is associated with a chip and includes an intrinsic feature. The self-test engine retrieves the intrinsic feature and communicates it to the identification engine. The identification engine receives the intrinsic feature, generates a first authentication value using the intrinsic feature, and stores the authentication value in memory. The self-test engine generates a second authentication value using an authentication challenge. The identification engine includes a compare circuitry that compares the first authentication value and the second authentication value and generates an authentication output value based on the results of the compare of the two values.

RELATED U.S. APPLICATION DATA

The present patent document is a continuation of U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 13/707,964, filed Dec. 7, 2012, entitled “SELF-AUTHENTICATINGCHIP”, the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

In general, embodiments of the present invention relate to systemhardware. Specifically, embodiments of the present invention relate to aself-authenticating chip having an intrinsic chip identifier (ID).

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

In today's global marketplace, the growing use of counterfeitinformation technology (IT) computer and hardware equipment is adifficult challenge facing businesses across the world. Counterfeithardware is becoming harder to identify, as it may display hightechnical specifications and reputed brand names. Counterfeit IThardware cuts into the revenue of hundreds of legitimate players in thesupply chain including dealers, suppliers, and manufacturers. For theselegitimate companies, the losses and damages may be significant becausecounterfeit IT hardware competes with authentic hardware. Ultimately, itmay affect a brand's reputation and marketplace equity.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Embodiments of the present invention provide an authenticating serviceof a chip using an intrinsic component. In a typical embodiment, anauthenticating device is provided that includes an identification (ID)engine, a self-test engine, and an intrinsic component. The intrinsiccomponent is associated with a chip and includes an intrinsic feature.For ID generation, the self-test engine retrieves the intrinsic featureand communicates it to the identification engine. The identificationengine receives the intrinsic feature, generates a first authenticationvalue using the intrinsic feature, and stores the authentication valuein memory. For ID authentication, the self-test engine generates asecond authentication value using an authentication challenge. Theidentification engine includes a compare circuitry that compares thefirst authentication value and the second authentication value andgenerates an authentication output value based on the results of thecompare of the two values.

A first aspect of the present invention provides a system for providingan authenticating service of a chip, the system comprising: anauthenticating device comprising an identification engine, a self-testengine, and an intrinsic component, wherein the intrinsic component isassociated with a chip and comprises an intrinsic feature; the self-testengine configured to retrieve the intrinsic feature and communicate theintrinsic feature to the identification engine; the identificationengine further configured to receive the intrinsic feature, generate afirst authentication value using the intrinsic feature, and store theauthentication value in memory; the self-test engine further configuredto generate a second authentication value using an authenticationchallenge; the identification engine further comprising a comparecircuitry configured to compare the first authentication value and thesecond authentication value; and the compare circuitry furtherconfigured to generate an authentication output value based on theresults of the compare of the first authentication value and the secondauthentication value.

A second aspect of the present invention provides a method for providingan authenticating service of a chip, the method comprising: retrievingan intrinsic feature at a self-test engine, wherein the intrinsicfeature is derived from an intrinsic component and the intrinsic featureis associated with a chip; receiving the intrinsic feature at anidentification engine; generating a first authentication value using theintrinsic feature at the identification engine; storing the firstauthentication value in memory; generating a second authentication valueat the self-test engine using an authentication challenge; comparing thefirst authentication value and the second authentication value at acompare circuitry; and generating an authentication output value at thecompare circuitry based on the results of the compare of the firstauthentication value and the second authentication value.

A third aspect of the present invention provides a method for deployinga system for providing an authenticating service of a chip, the systemcomprising a database and an authenticating device comprising anidentification engine, a self-test engine, and an intrinsic component,wherein the intrinsic component is associated with a chip and comprisesan intrinsic feature; the self-test engine configured to retrieve theintrinsic feature and communicate the intrinsic feature to theidentification engine; the identification engine further configured toreceive the intrinsic feature, generate a first authentication valueusing the intrinsic feature, and store the authentication value inmemory; the self-test engine further configured to generate a secondauthentication value using an authentication challenge generated by thedatabase; the identification engine further comprising a comparecircuitry configured to compare the first authentication value and thesecond authentication value; and the compare circuitry furtherconfigured to generate an authentication output value to the databasebased on the results of the compare of the first authentication valueand the second authentication value, and the database confirming theauthentication output value.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

These and other features of this invention will be more readilyunderstood from the following detailed description of the variousaspects of the invention taken in conjunction with the accompanyingdrawings in which:

FIG. 1 a depicts an example implementation of the self-authenticatedintrinsic identifier (ID) methodology according to an embodiment of thepresent invention.

FIG. 1 b depicts an example DRAM with 1 transistor/1 capacitor (1T1C)cells and a sense amplifier (SA).

FIG. 2 depicts a diagram of an example self-test engine according to anembodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 3 depicts a diagram of an example ID function generator accordingto an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 4 depicts a diagram of an example fuzzy comparator according to anembodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 5 depicts a method flow diagram for providing an authenticatingservice of a chip according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 6 depicts a system-level block diagram for secure authenticationusing a database and an authentication device according to an embodimentof the present invention.

The drawings are not necessarily to scale. The drawings are merelyschematic representations, not intended to portray specific parametersof the invention. The drawings are intended to depict only typicalembodiments of the invention, and therefore should not be considered aslimiting the scope of the invention. In the drawings, like numberingrepresents like elements.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Illustrative embodiments will now be described more fully herein withreference to the accompanying drawings, in which exemplary embodimentsare shown. This disclosure may, however, be embodied in many differentforms and should not be construed as limited to the exemplaryembodiments set forth herein. Rather, these exemplary embodiments areprovided so that this disclosure will be thorough and complete and willfully convey the scope of this disclosure to those skilled in the art.In the description, details of well-known features and techniques may beomitted to avoid unnecessarily obscuring the presented embodiments.

The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particularembodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of this disclosure.As used herein, the singular forms “a”, “an”, and “the” are intended toinclude the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicatesotherwise. Furthermore, the use of the terms “a”, “an”, etc., do notdenote a limitation of quantity, but rather denote the presence of atleast one of the referenced items. The term “set” is intended to mean aquantity of at least one. It will be further understood that the terms“comprises” and/or “comprising”, or “includes” and/or “including”, whenused in this specification, specify the presence of stated features,regions, integers, steps, operations, elements, and/or components, butdo not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features,regions, integers, steps, operations, elements, components, and/orgroups thereof. The terms “first” and “1^(st)” are used interchangeably,as well as the terms “second” and “2^(nd)”.

It will be understood that, although the terms first, second, third,etc., may be used herein to describe various buffers, cores, grades,and/or memories, these buffers, cores, grades, and/or memories shouldnot be limited by these terms. These terms are only used to distinguishone buffer, core, grade, or memory from another buffer, core, grade, ormemory. Thus, a first buffer, core, grade, or memory discussed belowcould be termed a second buffer, core, grade, or memory withoutdeparting from the teachings of the present inventive concept.

Embodiments are described herein with reference to cross-sectional orperspective illustrations that are schematic illustrations of idealizedembodiments (and intermediate structures). As such, variations from theshapes of the illustrations as a result, for example, of manufacturingtechniques and/or tolerances are to be expected. Thus, embodimentsshould not be construed as limited to the particular shapes of regionsillustrated herein but are to include deviations in shapes that result,for example, from manufacturing. For example, an edge or corner regionillustrated as having sharp edges may have somewhat rounded or curvedfeatures. Likewise, elements illustrated as circular or spherical may beoval in shape or may have certain straight or flattened portions. Thus,the regions illustrated in the figures are schematic in nature, andtheir shapes are not intended to illustrate the actual shape of a regionor element of a device and are not intended to limit the scope of thedisclosed embodiments.

Unless otherwise defined, all terms (including technical and scientificterms) used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by oneof ordinary skill in the art to which this inventive concept belongs. Itwill be further understood that terms such as those defined in commonlyused dictionaries should be interpreted as having a meaning that isconsistent with their meaning in the context of the relevant art andwill not be interpreted in an idealized or overly formal sense unlessexpressly so defined herein.

Embodiments of the present invention provide an authenticating serviceof a chip using an intrinsic component. In a typical embodiment, anauthenticating device is provided that includes an identification (ID)engine, a self-test engine, and an intrinsic component. The intrinsiccomponent is associated with a chip and includes an intrinsic feature.The self-test engine retrieves the intrinsic feature and communicates itto the identification engine. The identification engine receives theintrinsic feature, generates a first authentication value using theintrinsic feature, and stores the authentication value in memory. Theself-test engine generates a second authentication value using anauthentication challenge. The identification engine includes a comparecircuitry that compares the first authentication value and the secondauthentication value and generates an authentication output value basedon the results of the compare of the two values.

In order to curb the spread of counterfeit hardware, it is necessary todevelop methods to establish a hardware root of trust. Chip identifiersmust be unique and hard to clone. The large amounts of memory embeddedin chips provides a pathway to creating such keys by exploitingintrinsic properties from each bit cell which are a consequence ofinherent variability in the chip manufacturing process.

Such hardware keys belong to the family of physically unclonablefunctions (PUFs), which suffer from a lack of strict reproducibility.Some PUFs based on DRAM are guaranteed to change very little betweenassessments, and can therefore be made practical by means of a fuzzyauthentication algorithm. Because this approach always requires apattern recognition approximate match, secure hashing is not possible,and authentication requires an off-chip fuzzy comparison of the chipresponse to the chip unique identification string originally kept in themanufacturer's secure database. This requires large databases that canstore all the pattern identifiers for every chip, and it requirescommunicating the identifier over a network. The systems and methodsdescribed herein present a solution that can be used with any intrinsicidentifier which meets a minimum reproducibility threshold.

The self-authenticating intrinsic ID methodology employs an unclonablerandom bit pattern, preferably using embedded memory. A challenge isprovided to create a bit pattern. The chip possesses intrinsicinformation that is unique to each chip and results from manufacturingvariability. This information can be divided into two parts: achallenge/question and a response/answer. The question is preferably acombination of a subset of bit addresses belonging to the memory chip tobe challenged under certain test conditions, such as chip voltage, chiptemperature, or a specific pattern such as retention time (for DRAM).The response is the test result such as pass/fail for each tested bit,creating a bit pattern.

The bit pattern is converted into a binary string, which is encryptedand stored in memory, preferably eFUSE, within the same chip aftergeneration. The original equipment manufacturer's (OEM) database recordsthe corresponding challenge, which is unique to each chip and to theintrinsic ID from each chip. The challenge may be used for encryptingand decrypting the bit pattern for creating the binary string stored inthe memory, further improving security.

The key idea of the present invention is to enable 100% secureauthentication. The OEM database searches the ID to find thecorresponding challenge and sends it to the corresponding chip. When thechip is challenged with its corresponding challenge, it enablesdecryption of the binary string stored locally in memory to generate theoriginal bit map. A valid challenge applied to a different chip willgenerate a different response because the probability of collisionbetween responses is statistically negligible, while the challenges aretailored to ensure the uniqueness of the response set. Similarly, avalid bit pattern response stored in the chip's local memory bank canonly be reproduced by the chip with a valid challenge. Since there aretoo many bit subsets in a memory chip and too many different challengesto choose from, a counterfeiter cannot determine the bit subset or thechallenge with feasible resources in a cheap manner.

A comparator then performs a fuzzy or exact comparison between theresulting new pattern and the original bit map (in nonvolatile memory).A correct match results in the chip self-authenticating. The process isdescribed in more detail below with reference to FIGS. 1-6.

FIG. 1 a depicts an example implementation 100 of theself-authenticating intrinsic ID methodology. Implementation 100includes authentication device 102. The device 102 may be integratedwithin a product chip, or arranged on a system board. Authenticationdevice 102 includes identification (ID) engine 104, self-test engine106, and intrinsic component 108. ID engine 104 includes ID challengeinterface 110, ID function generator 112, memory 114, and comparecircuitry (or comparator) 116.

The ID engine 104 uses an authentication challenge to authenticate theintrinsic component 108. The intrinsic component 108 may be one of thecomponents used for a product chip. The intrinsic component isassociated with the chip and includes an intrinsic feature 120. In oneexample, the intrinsic feature 120 is made up of a matrix of values.

The authentication challenge 130 supplied by the OEM database (i.e.server) provides the domain information used to generate the intrinsicID (or authentication value). In this instance, the authenticationchallenge is location challenge 132. The domain information provided bythe location challenge 132 is input to the self-test engine 106 toproduce the domain address to access a specific address domain in theintrinsic component, preferably DRAM 108.

FIG. 1 b shows the details of the DRAM 108. The array consists of aplurality of 1 transistor/1 capacitor (1T1C) cells 150 which arecontrolled by wordline WL and Bitline. We write a 1 to every 1T1C cellin an area of the array, represented by the charge kept in thecapacitors. After a pause, each cell is read and sensed by senseamplifier SA 151, and the output of SA is output to BIST 106. If thecharge has not leaked to a logic zero, the output of SA is 1. If thecharge has leaked to a logic zero, the output of SA is 0. In lieu ofretention pause time tuning, V_(WL) can be used as a tunable array inputparameter to control the number of 0s and 1s from SA, because itcontrols the device leakage of the 1T1C cell. An increase in V_(WL)(wordline voltage) leads to an increase in memory bit fail count withoutincreasing the pause time, resulting in shorter time for ID generation.

FIG. 2 depicts a diagram 200 of an example self-test engine (or BIST)106 in FIG. 1 according to an embodiment of the present invention. Asshown, BIST 200 (or 106 in FIG. 1) includes address generator 204, datapattern generator 206, V_(WL) generator 208, data comparison circuit210, fail counter 212, and fail register 214.

The BIST 106 performs the function of generating the domain address andthe data pattern for testing the intrinsic component associated with theintrinsic feature, preferably DRAM 108. The location challenge 132 isprovided to the address generator 204. The address generator uses thelocation challenge 132 to produce the domain (or physical) address 222of the DRAM 108, or more specifically, the address to access thecorresponding 1T1C cells 150.

The fail counter 212 counts the number of fails to check if it is equalto the number specified. If not, the V_(WL) generator 208 varies theV_(WL) to generate more fails until the required number of fails hasbeen reached. In one example, the limit on the required number of failsmay be set on the domains requested. In another example, the limit maybe set for the entire memory. Upon generating the required number offails, a vector pattern corresponding to the requested domain fails isgenerated at the fail register 214 and sent to the ID function generator112 (FIG. 1).

Referring back to FIG. 1, the ID function generator 112 generates afirst authentication value 122 on the function specified by the serverin the authentication challenge 130 (i.e., location challenge 132). TheID function generator 112 performs the specified function. For example,the function may be a Bitwise OR on all the domain fail data (intrinsicfeature 120) to generate the first authentication value 122. The firstauthentication value 122 is stored in memory 114 (eFUSE) specified inthe authentication challenge 130. In computing, eFUSE is a technologydeveloped by International Business Machines Corporation which allowsfor the dynamic real-time reprogramming of computer chips. Multiple suchauthentication values can be produced for the same chip and stored ineFUSE 114.

During authentication, the authentication challenge 130 supplied by theOEM database (i.e. server) specifies the domain addresses as previouslymentioned. In this instance, the authentication challenge includes an IDfunction challenge 134 or memory challenge 136. A second authenticationvalue 124 is generated from the domains as illustrated above using theID function specified and the bit fails produced by the DRAM 108.

FIG. 3 depicts a diagram 300 of an example ID function generator 112according to an embodiment of the present invention. The ID functiongeneration is used to generate the 1^(st) authentication value 122 (noton FIG. 3 drawing) and the 2^(nd) authentication value 124. The IDfunction generator 112 may consist of different functions such as OR,XOR, shifter, and the like. These functions process the domain IDs(i.e., intrinsic feature 120) from all the domains generated by the BIST106 (FIG. 2). The ID function to be used is specified by the ID functionchallenge 134 from the authentication challenge provided by the OEMdatabase (i.e. server). A feedback register (register 310) stores the IDas it gets processed depending on the function. When all the domainsdetermined by the authentication challenge have been processed, the IDstored in the register is sent for either storing in memory 114 (FIG. 1)(as the 1^(st) authentication value 122) or for comparison (as the2^(nd) authentication value 124) with the 1^(st) authentication value122 to authenticate the chip. As depicted in FIG. 3, the 2^(nd)authentication value 124 is generated.

Referring back to FIG. 1, the first authentication value 122 is comparedwith the second authentication value 124. An authentication output value140 may be generated based on the results of the comparison. In oneexample, the compare circuitry 116 may be a fuzzy comparator.

FIG. 4 depicts a diagram 400 of an example fuzzy comparator 402(according to an embodiment of the present invention). The fuzzycomparator may be used for the compare circuit 116 in FIG. 1. Anintrinsic ID (i.e., authentication value) is known to lack strictreproducibility. Fuzzy pattern recognition, on the other hand, has beensuccessfully demonstrated for DRAM chips. Using an upper and lower guardband for authenticated bits, the 1^(st) authentication value 122 may beuniquely authenticated by comparison to the 2^(nd) authentication value124

The fuzzy comparator 402 compares the 1^(st) authentication value 122(i.e., the recorded eFUSE ID) with the 2^(nd) authentication value 124(i.e., the generated chip ID). The comparison may be implemented as asimple XOR or AND of the individual bits. A counter 404 counts thenumber of matches. The fuzzy comparator 402 may accommodate a specificnumber of matches to account for the variation in the generatedauthentication values. If the number of matches is smaller than apredefined fuzzy threshold 406, the fuzzy comparator 402 returns amismatch indicating that the 1^(st) authentication value 122 failed tomatch with the 2^(nd) authentication value 124.

A one challenge-response pair approach provides a means ofself-authentication, but it is an approach vulnerable toman-in-the-middle attacks. If a third party intercepts the result of thelocal match that the chip sends back to the OEM database (i.e., server),the third party can easily distinguish between a Yes or No, since thereare only two outcomes.

Secure identification may be accomplished by generating multiplechallenge-response pairs. Additionally, multiple challenges must beprovided at each authentication step, generating a string of resultsfrom local response matches. Also, to avoid trivial result strings of Yor N, the questions must include a combination of true challenges andfalse challenges, which can be randomized at every authenticationrequest from the challenges in the database, since there are guard bandsensuring a negligible number of collisions for challenges and responsesbelonging to different pairs. The string of 1s (Y) and 0s (N) may resultin a bit string created after the intrinsic ID comparisons are made. Thebit string has a definite expectation value on the OEM's side and mustbe reproducible. Such a string can be hashed for increased security byusing a one-way function (irreversible), and if the results of the hashon the OEM's side and customer's side match, then the chip is securelyauthenticated. The expected output value generated by the OEM databasefor each challenge must match the authentication output value from theauthentication device in order to result in confirmation of the chip'sauthenticity.

FIG. 5 depicts a method flow diagram 500 for providing an authenticatingservice of a chip according to an embodiment of the present invention.At S1, the intrinsic feature is retrieved at the self-test engine. AtS2, the intrinsic feature is received at the identification (ID) engine.At S3, first authentication value is generated at the identificationengine. At S4, the first authentication value is stored in memory. AtS5, the second authentication value is generated at the self-testengine. At S6, the values are compared at a compare circuitry.

It will be appreciated that the exemplary method process flow 500 ofFIG. 5 represents one possible implementation of a process flow forproviding an authenticating service of a chip, and that other processflows are possible within the scope of the invention. The process flowillustrates the architecture, functionality, and operation of possibleimplementations of systems, methods, and computer program productsaccording to various embodiments of the present invention. It should benoted that, in some alternative implementations, the functions noted inthe blocks may occur out of the order noted in FIG. 5. For example, twoblocks shown in succession may, in fact, be executed substantiallyconcurrently.

FIG. 6 shows the system 600 which controls the authentication flowbetween the database 610 and the authentication device 102. The database610 requests authentication from authentication device 102, whichprovides in turn an extrinsic feature back to the database. The databasethen generates an authentication challenge or a string of authenticationchallenges based on the value of the extrinsic feature. Theauthentication device returns an authentication output value or a stringof authentication output values to the database. The database finallyconfirms the string of authentication output values from theauthentication device 102, and generates an authentication outputresult. More specifically, the confirmation process includes at leastone authentication output value from the authentication devicecorresponding to a match between the 1^(st) authentication value and2^(nd) authentication value in FIG. 1, and preferably at least oneauthentication output value corresponds to a mistmatch between the two.

Secure self-authentication follows from scaling this approach to aseries of randomized challenges, of which a few are expected to resultin a correct local match (at least one in order to avoid a trivialresponse). The new bit string comprised of all the false (0) andpositive (1) matches is unique and exactly reproducible. This isanalogous to a lie detector test with a secretly known set of absolutetruths. The questions/challenges and answers/responses possess a truthtable known only to the OEM, and every answer has only two outcomes(false—0 or positive—1). The chip itself does not possess keyinformation that validates the local intrinsic information storedlocally in memory. This key information that the OEM stores in adatabase is preferably the physical addresses of the group of bitspossessing the intrinsic signature, which can be combined with a set oftest conditions such as chip voltages, which may or may not includeV_(WL), and/or chip temperatures, which may or may not be controllable.A counterfeiter that copies the non-volatile component has a negligiblechance of creating a chip that can be successfully validated due to themissing key information and the unclonability of the intrinsic memorysignature.

In summary, this method and related circuits create secure reproduciblerandom strings which are unique to each chip and derived from anintrinsic ID which does not need to be strictly reproducible. Theresulting strings, which can be randomized at each authentication, arecompatible with hashing algorithms, leading to increased security.

The foregoing description of various aspects of the invention has beenpresented for purposes of illustration and description. It is notintended to be exhaustive or to limit the invention to the precise formdisclosed and, obviously, many modifications and variations arepossible. Such modifications and variations that may be apparent to aperson skilled in the art are intended to be included within the scopeof the invention as defined by the accompanying claims.

What is claimed is:
 1. A system for providing an authenticating serviceof a chip, the system comprising: an authenticating device comprising anidentification engine, a self-test engine, and an intrinsic componentassociated with a chip that is unique to the chip, results frommanufacturing variability, and has an intrinsic feature; the self-testengine configured to retrieve the intrinsic feature and communicate theintrinsic feature to the identification engine; the identificationengine further configured to receive the intrinsic feature, generate afirst authentication value using the intrinsic feature, and store theauthentication value in memory; the self-test engine further configuredto generate a second authentication value using an authenticationchallenge; the identification engine further comprising a comparecircuitry configured to compare the first authentication value and thesecond authentication value; and the compare circuitry furtherconfigured to generate an authentication output value based on theresults of the compare of the first authentication value and the secondauthentication value.
 2. The system according to claim 1, wherein theauthentication device is embedded on the chip or the authenticationdevice and the chip are integrated on a board.
 3. The system accordingto claim 1, further comprising a database configured to control theauthentication challenge and store the authentication challenge and anextrinsic feature of the authentication device, wherein the extrinsicfeature is associated with the intrinsic component.
 4. The systemaccording to claim 1, wherein the intrinsic feature comprises a matrixof values, wherein a subset of the matrix of values is an intrinsicfeature subset.
 5. The system according to claim 4, wherein theauthentication challenge further comprises a location for each matrixvalue within the intrinsic feature subset.
 6. The system according toclaim 1, further comprising a plurality of authentication challenges. 7.The system according to claim 3, wherein the database confirms a stringof authentication output values, from the authentication device, andgenerates an authentication output result.
 8. The system according toclaim 7, wherein the confirmation process includes at least oneauthentication output value from the authentication device correspondingto a match between the 1^(st) authentication value and 2^(nd)authentication value, and at least one authentication output valuecorresponds to a mismatch between the two.
 9. The system according toclaim 1, wherein the authentication challenge comprises a locationchallenge.
 10. The system according to claim 1, wherein theauthentication challenge comprises at least one of an identification(ID) challenge or memory challenge.
 11. A method for providing anauthenticating service of a chip, the method comprising: retrieving anintrinsic feature associated with a chip at a self-test engine, whereinthe intrinsic feature is derived from an intrinsic component that isunique to the chip and results from manufacturing variability; receivingthe intrinsic feature at an identification engine; generating a firstauthentication value using the intrinsic feature at the identificationengine; storing the first authentication value in memory; generating asecond authentication value at the self-test engine using anauthentication challenge; comparing the first authentication value andthe second authentication value at a compare circuitry; and generatingan authentication output value at the compare circuitry based on theresults of the compare of the first authentication value and the secondauthentication value.
 12. The method according to claim 11, wherein theauthentication device is embedded on the chip or the authenticationdevice and the chip are integrated on a board.
 13. The method accordingto claim 11, further comprising controlling the authentication challengeat a database and storing the first authentication challenge and anextrinsic feature of the authentication device, wherein the extrinsicfeature is associated with the intrinsic component.
 14. The methodaccording to claim 11, wherein the intrinsic feature comprises a matrixof values, wherein a subset of the matrix of values is an intrinsicfeature subset.
 15. The method according to claim 14, wherein theauthentication challenge further comprises a location for each matrixvalue within the intrinsic feature subset.
 16. The method according toclaim 11, further comprising a plurality of authentication challenges.17. The method according to claim 13, wherein the database confirms astring of authentication output values, from the authentication device,and generates an authentication output result.
 18. The method accordingto 17, wherein the confirmation process includes at least oneauthentication output value from the authentication device correspondingto a match between the 1^(st) authentication value and 2^(nd)authentication value, and at least one authentication output valuecorresponds to a mismatch between the two.
 19. The method according toclaim 11, wherein the authentication challenge comprises at least one ofa location challenge, identification (ID) challenge, or memorychallenge.
 20. A method for deploying a system for providing anauthenticating service of a chip, the system comprising: providing anauthenticating device comprising an identification engine, a self-testengine, and an intrinsic component associated with a chip that is uniqueto the chip, results from manufacturing variability, and has anintrinsic feature; the self-test engine configured to retrieve theintrinsic feature and communicate the intrinsic feature to theidentification engine; the identification engine further configured toreceive the intrinsic feature, generate a first authentication valueusing the intrinsic feature, and store the authentication value inmemory; the self-test engine further configured to generate a secondauthentication value using an authentication challenge; theidentification engine further comprising a compare circuitry configuredto compare the first authentication value and the second authenticationvalue; and the compare circuitry further configured to generate anauthentication output value based on the results of the compare of thefirst authentication value and the second authentication value.